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Propaganda and the Public Mind | Excerpt
From Chapter 2: “US to World: Get Out of the Way”
Barsamian: One of the advantages of leaving the United States is to be exposed to different media. I traveled to Thailand in January. The Nation is one of their two English-language newspapers. There was a very critical article by Suravit Jayanama titled, “Containing America in the Post-Cold War Era.” The article asked, “While Washington talks about containing Saddam Hussein, what about the need to contain a superpower that zealously acts to protect its own interests?”
Chomsky: That’s the attitude in much of the world, and with justice. When the world’s only superpower, which has essentially a monopoly of force, announces openly, We will use force and violence as we choose and if you don’t like it get out of the way, there’s a reason why that should frighten people. Incidentally, the reaction after the Gulf War was the same. It was described in the United States as a triumph of morality and courage. But if you look around the world, it was quite different. I reviewed as much as I could discover of world coverage, and people were very frightened. They said, These guys are out of control. Who are they going to attack next? There is no deterrent left. The United States will do as it pleases, and everybody else had better watch out.
Barsamian: A number of U.N. member states and members of the Security Council opposed the U.S. missile attacks in August 1998 on Afghanistan and Sudan. That number noticeably increased with the December attack on Iraq. What accounts for that?
Chomsky: I think that what accounts for it is concern and fear, which the U.S. is trying to stir up. It’s not trying to hide it. This December, one senior European diplomat at the U.N. was quoted as saying that the U.S. has given up on the U.N. It doesn’t want to have it anymore. It’s now going to conduct its policy through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the World Trade Organization, which it feels it can control. That’s close to accurate. I think the U.N. will still be used when you can palm off some problem on it. As for NATO and the WTO, they’re used only when they follow orders. When the European Union brought a case to the WTO condemning the U.S. embargo of Cuba, the Clinton administration responded by withdrawing WTO jurisdiction, just like Reagan did with the World Court. Actually, the U.S. claimed what they called a “national security exemption.” Our national existence is at stake by denial of food to Cuba. They didn’t make this too prominent, because it’s too ludicrous, but that was apparently the technical reason. So the WTO, yes, as long as they follow orders. If it’s an unimportant matter, we may give in to them. NATO, yes, if they do what we tell them. But the U.N. is just not enough under control.
The reaction to the U.N. has been quite interesting over the years. In the early years, the U.S. was very much in favor of the U.N. It was wonderful, because they were doing everything that Washington wanted. With decolonization, that began to change. By the 1960s, relations between the U.N. and Washington were fairly hostile, although the U.N. was still under control. For example, the U.N. never raised the issue of the U.S. war in Vietnam, although most of the countries were passionately opposed, and so was the Secretary General, U Thant. I had a private meeting with him in December 1966 at U.N. headquarters. It would be unfair to report a private conversation, but it was clear he had said the same thing to other people—that he thought this was a real atrocity and it ought to be ended, but the U.N. couldn’t do anything about it. It couldn’t even discuss it publicly. It was quite different when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. Then the U.N. could take a strong stand and denounce it. But not when the U.S. attacked Vietnam.
By the 1970s and particularly by the 1980s, there was simply an attempt to eliminate the organization. The most striking example was when third world countries, the South, tried to break the Western monopoly over the information systems. There was an attempt through UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, to broaden and democratize access to information media and technology. The U.S. reacted with complete hysteria. There followed a very interesting series of incidents in which there was a flood of lies and condemnations of this effort, claiming that it was an attack on freedom of press and state regimentation of news. It was all lies. It was demonstrated to be lies. The lies were repeated after they were refuted, and the refutations were not permitted publication.
There’s a good study of this by William Preston, Ed Herman and Herbert Schiller, Hope and Folly, which documents the history in detail. I don’t think there was a single review of the book. William Preston is a historian of the U.N. He commented on the irony that after the United States condemned UNESCO for attempting to undermine the free marketplace of ideas, the U.S. demonstrated that there is no free marketplace of ideas by refusing even to publish the refutations of the lies. That’s exactly what happened. Ed Herman has a detailed accounting, as he usually does, of the media coverage and how it worked—and the refusal to allow refutations to appear and the continual lying after it was known to be false.
What all of this reveals, including the silence over what happened, is a really profound fear that control over doctrine and information might escape the hands of those who are powerful. If it gets into the hands of other people, we’re in trouble. And they understand that. UNESCO was practically destroyed because of this. It was tamed. The U.S. is trying to undermine the U.N. That’s why it doesn’t pay its dues, because it’s no longer a useful instrument of power. When it can be used, it will be used. So when the Somalia operation turned into a catastrophe, then it was fine. The U.N.—U.N. incompetence—could take the blame. And maybe sometimes if there’s something the U.S. doesn’t want to do and the U.N. can be a cover, they’ll use it.
Barsamian: You also observed that another similarity with Libya was the prime-time bombing in April 1986.
Chomsky: In the case of Libya, it was really dramatic. It took a lot of self-discipline for the media and commentators never to comment on this. The Libya bombing was precisely at 7 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, and that was no small trick. That happened to be at the time when the three television networks had their evening news. That meant that the Reagan administration was given free time on television. First of all, the television cameras immediately shifted to the exciting events in Tripoli and Benghazi - lights going off, bombs falling, all great stuff. Then you go to Washington and the Reagan administration says what’s going on is “self-defense against future attack.” They essentially control the story for the first hour. Then of course it’s all over.
A couple of questions come to mind. How come the bombing was precisely at 7 p.m., when all three networks begin their evening newscasts? That was no easy job. It was a six-hour flight from England. They couldn’t even fly directly because the continental countries refused to allow overflights. They were opposed to the bombing. So they had to fly over the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. They got there precisely at 7 p.m. The first major war crime in history that was timed for prime-time television.
The second question is, Why were the networks even there? Does ABC have a studio in Libya? They were there because they were told, Be ready at 2 a.m. Libyan time. We’re going to put on a show for you. So the networks were informed of this exciting event. Nobody was supposed to notice this. You can look back to 1986 and see how much commentary there was about this very subtle fact.
Now let’s go to Iraq. That bombing was 5 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, just before the network news programs. Maybe it’s an accident, but I think there are grounds for suspicion.
Barsamian: In late January you did a benefit talk for Mobilization for Survival in Cambridge. Someone in the audience asked you what the U.S. should do about Iraq. You had a very interesting response.
Chomsky: I think again whenever something like that comes to mind, the first thing we should do is react with skepticism to what we ourselves are asking. There’s a presupposition, namely that we should do something about Saddam Hussein. Is that correct? Suppose for example the question was, What should Iran do about Saddam Hussein? Is that a proper question? You can think of things Iran could do. Maybe they should attack Iraq with nuclear weapons. Is that the right answer? Is that the right question? Iran has much more reason to be concerned with Saddam Hussein than we do. Iran lost hundreds of thousands of its own citizens just a decade ago, when they were attacked by Iraq, and had to capitulate because the U.S. Navy got in on the side of Saddam Hussein. They were victims of gas attacks and chemical warfare attacks, too. So they’ve got a lot more concern with Saddam Hussein than we do.
Should we ask the question, What should Iran do about Saddam Hussein? As soon as that question is asked, we see that it’s an absurdity. Iran shouldn’t do anything about Saddam Hussein because they have no authority to do it. If they have no authority, we have vastly less authority. After all, we’re his backers and supporters. We weren’t attacked by him. We supported his atrocities. So the idea that we have to do something about Saddam Hussein already begs some pretty remarkable questions.
If you ask, What should we do about Saddam Hussein, well, maybe the answer is, the same as what Iran should do, namely follow the law. If Iran feels threatened by Saddam Hussein, and they have every reason to be, approach the U.N. Security Council, and ask them to act in response to this threat. In fact, they don’t feel threatened at the moment because Saddam Hussein is so weakened by the U.S. attacks and the sanctions that he doesn’t really pose much of a threat by the standards of the region. But if they feel it, that’s the way to react.
What should we do about Saddam Hussein? The first thing you should do is remember an old medical adage, “First, do no harm.” After you’ve gotten that far, you can start asking, Can I do anything good? So let’s begin with “First, do no harm.” We’re doing a lot of harm. We’re doing harm by insisting on a policy which is strengthening Saddam Hussein and causing great suffering to Iraqi civilians. That’s doing a lot of harm, to the cost of hundreds of thousands, maybe over a million dead. That’s harm. So we should stop doing harm and at the same time strengthening Saddam Hussein. More harm was done by the bombing, not only by the damage, but because it ended the inspection regime. The inspection regime wasn’t perfect, by any means, but it was pretty successful, far more successful than bombing in reducing Iraq’s military force.
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